A secure reliable multicast protocol enables a process to send a message to a group of recipients such that all correct destinations receive the same message, despite the malicious efforts of fewer than a third of the total number of processes, including the sender. This has been shown to be a useful tool in building secure distributed services, albeit with a cost that typically grows linearly with the size of the system. For very large networks, for which this is prohibitive, we present two approaches for reducing the cost: First, we show a protocol whose cost is on the order of the number of tolerated failures. Secondly, we show how relaxing the consistency requirement to a probabilistic guarantee can reduce the associated cost, effectively to a constant.
Introduction
Communication over a large and sparse internet is a challenging problem because communication links experience diverse delays and failures. Moreover, in a wide area network (WAN), security is most crucial, since communicating parties are geographically dispersed and thus are more prone to attacks. The problem addressed in this paper is the secure reliable multicast problem, namely, how to distribute messages among a large group of participants so that all the (correctly behaving) participants agree on messages' contents, despite the malicious cooperation of up to a third of the members.
Experience with building robust distributed systems proves that (secure) reliable multicast is an important tool for distributed applications. Distributed platforms can increase the efficiency of services and diminish the trust put in each component. For example, the Omega key management system [19] provides key backup, recovery and other functions in a penetration-tolerant way using the Rampart distributed communication infrastructure [18] . In such a service and Present address: Institute of Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel (e-mail: dalia@cs.huji.ac.il) others, distribution might increase the sensitivity to failures and malicious attacks. To address issues of availability and security, distributed services must rely on mechanisms for maintaining consistent intermediate state and for making coordinated decisions. Reliable multicast underlies the mechanisms used in many infrastructure tools supporting such distributed systems (for a representative collection, cf. [16] ).
Previous work on the reliable multicast problem suffers from message complexity and computation costs that do not scale to very large communication groups: Toueg's echo broadcast [3, 22] requires O(n 2 ) authenticated message exchanges for each message delivery (where n is the size of the group). Reiter improved this message complexity in the ECHO protocol of the Rampart system [17] through the usage of digital signatures. The ECHO protocol incurs O(n) signed message exchanges, and thus, message complexity is improved at the expense of increased computation cost. Malkhi and Reiter [11] extended this approach to amortize the cost of computing digital signatures over multiple messages through a technique called acknowledgment chaining, where a signed acknowledgment directly verifies the message it acknowledges and indirectly, every message that message acknowledges. Nevertheless, O(n) digital signatures are in the critical path between message sending and its delivery. For a very large group of hundreds or thousands of members, this may be prohibitive.
In this paper, we propose two approaches for reducing the cost and delay associated with reliable multicast. First, we show a protocol whose cost is on the order of the number of tolerated failures, rather than of the group size. Secondly, we show how relaxing the consistency requirement to a selected probabilistic guarantee can reduce the associated cost to a constant. The principle underlying agreement on message contents in previous works, as well as ours, is the following (see Fig. 1 ): For a process p to send a message m to the group of processes, signed validations are obtained for m from a certain set of processes, thereby enabling delivery of m. We call this validation set the witness set of m, denoted witness(m). Witness sets are chosen so that any pair of them intersect at a correct process, and such that some witness set is always accessible despite failures. More precisely, witness sets satisfy the Consistency and Availabil- ity requirements of Byzantine dissemination quorum systems (cf. [12] ), as follows: Definition 1.1 A dissemination quorum system is a set of subsets, called quorums, satisfying: For every set B of faulty processes, and every two quorums
For every set B of faulty processes, there exists a quorum Q such that Q ⊆ B (Availability).
Using dissemination quorums as witness sets for messages, if a faulty process generates two messages m, m with the same sender and sequence number and different contents (called conflicting messages), the corresponding witness sets intersect at a correct process (by Consistency). Thus, they cannot both obtain validations, and at most one of them will be delivered by the correct processes of the system. Further, dissemination quorums ensure availability, such that a correct process can always obtain validation from a witness set despite possible failures. For a resilience threshold t < (n − 1)/3 , previous works used quorums of size (n + t + 1)/2 , providing both consistency and availability.
Our first improvement in the 3T protocol drops the quorum size from (n + t + 1)/2 to 2t + 1. When t is a small constant, this improvement is substantial, since we need only wait for O(t) processes, no matter how big the WAN might be. Briefly, the trick in bringing down the size of the witness sets is in designating for every message m a witness set W 3T (m) of size 3t + 1, determined by its sender and sequence number. A message must get validations from 2t + 1 processes, out of the designated set of 3t + 1, in order to be delivered.
Our second improvement stems from relaxing the requirement on processes to (always) agree on messages' contents to a probabilistic requirement. This leads to a protocol that consists of two-regimes: The first one, called the nofailure regime, is applied in faultless scenarios. It is very efficient, incurring only a constant overhead in message exchanges and signature computing. The second regime is the recovery regime, and is resorted to in case of failures. The two regimes inter-operate by having the witnesses of the nofailure regime actively probe the system to detect conflicting messages. We introduce a probabilistic protocol combining both regimes, active t , whose properties are as follows:
-Given a resilience threshold t, active t can be tuned to guarantee agreement on messages contents by all the correct processes on all but an arbitrarily small expected fraction of the messages. Those messages that might be subject to conflicting delivery are determined by the random choices made by the processes after the execution starts, and hence a non-adaptive adversary cannot effect their choice. -The overhead of forming agreement on message contents in active t in faultless circumstances is determined by two constants that depend on only (and not on the system size or t).
In this paper, we assume a static set of communicating processes. It is possible, however, to use known techniques (e.g., in the group communication context one can use [17] ) to extend our protocols to operate in a dynamic environment in which processes may leave or join the set of destination processes and in which processes may fail and recover.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we formally present our assumptions about the system. Section 3 presents a precise problem definition, and demonstrates feasibility through a simple solution. Section 4 contains the 3T protocol description, and Sect. 5 contains the active t protocol description. In Sect. 6 we analyze the load induced on processes participating in our protocols. We conclude in Sect. 7.
Model
The system contains n participating processes, denoted P = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }, up to t ≤ (n − 1)/3 of which may be arbitrarily (Byzantine) faulty. A faulty process may deviate from the behavior dictated by the protocol in an arbitrary way, subject to cryptographic assumptions. (Such failures are called authenticated Byzantine failures.)
Processes interact solely through message passing. Every pair of correct processes is connected via an authenticated FIFO channel, that guarantees the identity of senders using any one of well known cryptographic techniques. We assume no limit on the relative speeds of different processes or a known upper bound on message transmission delays. However, we assume that every message sent between two processes has a known probability of reaching its destination, which grows to one as the elapsed time from sending increases. The last property is needed only in the active t protocol, and ensures that delays can be set in the protocol to guarantee that fault notification reaches all correct processes. In practice, this can be realized using quality guaranteed outof-band communication for control messages.
A system that admits Byzantine failures is often abstracted as having an adversary working against the successful execution of protocols. We assume the following limitations on the adversary's powers: The adversary chooses which processes are faulty at the beginning of the execution, and thus its choice is non-adaptive. Every process possesses a private key, known only to itself, that may be used for signing data using a known public key cryptographic method 1. For a process p i to WAN-multicast message m, (such that sender(m) = p i ), and p i has previously sent messages up to sequence number seq(m) − 1, process p i sends <E, regular, p i , seq(m), H(m)> to every process in P , and waits to obtain A = {<E, ack, p i , seq(m), H(m)> K j | p j ∈ P }, a set of signed acknowledgments from any set P of (n + t + 1)/2 distinct processes. It then sends the following to every process in P :
<E, deliver, m, A> .
2. When p i receives a message <E, regular, p j , cnt, h> from p j , and no conflicting message was previously received from p j , then p i sends back to p j a signed acknowledgment <E, ack, p j , cnt, h> K i .
3. When p i receives a message <E, deliver, m, A>, such that A contains a valid set of acknowledgments for <sender(m), seq(m), H(m)>, (acknowledgements for m from (n + t + 1)/2 distinct processes) and such that delivery i [sender(m)] = seq(m) − 1, p i performs WAN-deliver(m) and sets delivery i [sender(m)] to seq(m). If a timeout period has passed and p j is not known to have delivered m, p i sends <E, deliver, m, A> to p j . Fig. 2 . The E protocol (such as [21] ). Let d be any data block. We denote by d Ki the signature of p i on the data d by means of p i 's private key. We assume that every process in the system may obtain the public keys of all of the other processes, such that it can verify the authenticity of signatures. The adversary cannot access the local memories of the correct processes or the communication among them, nor break their private keys, and thus cannot obtain data internal to computations in the protocols. Our protocols also make use of a cryptographically secure hash function H (such as MD5 [20] ). Our assumption is that it is computationally infeasible for the adversary to find two different messages m and m such that H(m) = H(m ).
The problem definition and a basic solution
A reliable multicast protocol provides each process p with two operations:
WAN-multicast(m): p sends the multicast message m to the group. WAN-deliver(m): p delivers a multicast message m, making it available to applications at p.
For convenience, we assume that a multicast message m contains several fields: The protocol should guarantee that all of the correct members of the group agree on the delivered messages, and furthermore, that messages sent by correct processes are (eventually) delivered by all of the correct processes.
More precisely, the protocol should maintain the following properties:
Integrity: Let p be a correct process. Then for any sequence number s, p performs WAN-deliver(m) for a message m with seq(m) = s at most once, and if sender(m) is correct, then only if sender(m) executed WAN-multicast(m).
Self-delivery:
Let p be a correct process. If p executes WAN-multicast(m) then eventually p delivers m, i.e., eventually p executes WAN-deliver(m). Reliability: Let p i and p j be two correct processes. If p i delivers a message from p k with sequence number seq (via WAN-deliver(m)), then (eventually) p j delivers a message from p k with sequence number seq. (Probabilistic) Agreement: Let p i and p j be two correct processes. Let p i deliver a message m, p j deliver m , such that sender(m) = sender(m ) and seq(m) = seq(m ). Then (with very high probability) p i and p j delivered the same message, i.e., payload(m) = payload(m )
The problem statement above is strictly weaker than the Byzantine agreement problem [10] , which is known to be unsolvable in asynchronous systems [6] . This statement holds even if we use the unconditional Agreement requirement. The reason is that only messages from correct processes are required to be delivered, and thus messages from faulty processes can "hang" forever. Note that there is no ordering requirement among different messages, and thus the problem statement is weaker than the totally ordered reliable multicast problem, which can be solved only probabilistically [13, 14] . The reliable multicast problem is solvable in our environment, as is demonstrated by the E protocol depicted in Fig. 2 (which borrows from the Rampart ECHO multicast protocol [17] ). Throughout the protocol, each process p i maintains a delivery vector delivery i [] containing the sequence number of the last WAN-delivered message from every other process. delivery i [] is initially set to zero.
This protocol assumes the presence of a stability mechanism, (SM), utilized by the processes, that allows each process to learn when a message has been delivered by other processes, for purposes of re-transmission and garbage collection. The details of such a mechanism are omitted (for the details of such a mechanism, in the context of a group communication system, see e.g. [2] ). However, we note that by properly tuning timeout periods and by packing multiple messages together (e.g., by piggybacking on regular traffic), the cost of such a mechanism is negligible in practice. The mechanism must assure the following properties: SM Reliability: Let p i and p j be two correct processes. If p i performs WAN-deliver(m), then eventually p j knows that p i performed WAN-deliver(m). SM Integrity: Let p i and p j be two correct processes. If p j learns from the stability mechanism that p i performed WAN-deliver(m), then indeed, p i performed WAN-deliver (m).
Protocols can be used as components in more complex protocols; to separate the messages of disparate protocols, each contains an initial field indicating to which protocol it belongs. Messages within each protocol similarly contain fields indicating their role in the protocol. (E.g. as acknowledgements.)
The E protocol ensures secure reliable multicast. However, it is inefficient in faultless runs, incurring an overhead (in addition to O(n) transmissions for multicast) of O(n) signatures and message exchanges per delivery; this might be an intolerable overhead for very large groups. We shall improve it in the next section.
We now proceed to verify that the E protocol satisfies Integrity, Self-delivery, Reliability and Agreement. This is the basic proof in this paper; while simple and straightforward, it facilitates later proofs of optimizations.
In proving the security of the E protocol, we will make use of the fact that in any run of the protocol, no correct process multicasts conflicting messages and no correct process signs conflicting acknowledgements. In addition, the lemma below states several properties that relate acknowledgement sets to the corresponding message transmissions: Lemma 3.1 In any run of the E protocol, the following hold:
1. If process p is correct in a run, then a correct process signs an acknowledgement for a message m with sender(m) = p only if p multicasts message m. 2. If process p is correct in a run, and the run contains a set of valid E acknowledgements for a message m with sender(m) = p, then p WAN-multicast message m in the run.
The run does not contain two valid sets of conflicting E
acknowledgements.
Proof. A correct process q signs an acknowledgement for m by a correct sender only when it receives m over an authenticated channel from sender(m). The first property then follows from the fact that a signed acknowledgement from q of the form <E, ack, p, cnt, H(m)> Kq contains the identity of the sender p = sender(m). To see that the second property holds, recall that a valid acknowledgement set contains acknowledgements from (n + t + 1)/2 distinct processes, which must contain at least t+1 processes. Hence, a valid set of acknowledgements must contain an acknowledgement signed by a correct process. Since p is correct, by property (1) of the lemma, m was multicast by p.
Finally, note that two sets of valid acknowledgements must intersect in at least one correct process. Since a correct process never signs conflicting acknowledgements, the third property follows.
Theorem 3.2 (Integrity) Let p i be a correct process participating in the E protocol. Then for any message m, p i performs WAN-deliver(m) at most once, and if sender(m) is correct, then only if sender(m) executed WAN-multicast(m).
Proof. That p i suppresses duplicate deliveries is immediate from the protocol. It is left to show that if sender(m) is correct, it must have sent m. To prove this fact, consider that for p i to deliver m, p i must have obtained a set A of valid acknowledgments for m. By Lemma 3.1 (2) , it follows that m must have been sent by sender(m). Proof. Notice that (n + t + 1)/2 ≤ n − t, thus there are at least (n + t + 1)/2 correct processes in P . Thus, if p i sends <E, regular, p i , seq(m), H(m)> to every process in P , then at least (n + t + 1)/2 correct processes p j will receive it. Since no correct process receives a conflicting message from p i , each will acknowledge it, sending back a <E, ack, p i , seq(m), H(m)> Kj message to p i , thereby enabling delivery of m by p i . Proof. For p i to deliver m, p i must have obtained a set A of valid acknowledgments for m from (n + t + 1)/2 processes. If p i learns that p j delivered m, then by SM Integrity we are done. Alternatively, if p i does not learn that p j delivered m, then after a timeout period p i sends <E, deliver, m, A> to p j . By Lemma 3.1(3), p j cannot have received a conflicting set of acknowledgements, so at the latest, upon receipt of <E, deliver, m, A> from p i , process p j performs WAN-deliver(m). Proof. For p i to deliver m, p i must have obtained a set A of valid acknowledgments for m from (n + t + 1)/2 processes in P . Likewise, p j must have obtained a set A of (n + t + 1)/2 valid acknowledgments for m . By 
The 3T Protocol
In this section we introduce the 3T protocol. The improvement in this protocol over the E protocol above comes from designating a potential witness set for each message m based on the pair <sender(m), seq(m)>. The choice of potential witness set for p i 's k'th message is determined by a function W 3T (p i , k), whose range is the set of subsets of exactly (3t + 1) distinct process id's. For simplicity, we denote W 3T (m) = W 3T (sender(m), seq(m)). For efficiency, W 3T could be chosen to distribute the load of witnessing over distinct sets of processes for different messages. Figure 3 provides the details of the 3T protocol.
For each message m the 3T protocol uses a witness set of size 2t+1 out of a potential witness set, W 3T (m), of 3t+1 processes. The choice of the 2t + 1 threshold is significant, since it guarantees that a majority of the correct members of W 3T (m) acknowledge the message m and thus no two conflicting messages can receive the required threshold. As less than a third of W 3T (m) could be faulty, 3T ensures Integrity, Reliability, Self-delivery and Agreement as in the E protocol above. This protocol is used for failure-recovery in the active t protocol below, in order to guarantee Selfdelivery.
The overhead incurred (in faultless runs, and not measuring the Stability Mechanism) is 2t + 1 signature generations and message exchanges per delivery.
The active t Protocol
In this section, we relax the requirements and provide a protocol that guarantees (only) Probabilistic Agreement. Thus, we allow the possibility that a small fraction of the delivered messages may conflict.
The idea of the active t protocol is as follows: We make use of a uniformly distributed function R from input pairs of the form <sender(m), seq(m)> designating witness sets W active (m) of κ processes in P . The function R is determined at set-up time, e.g., by seeding it with some random value that processes choose collectively. By our assumptions, this means that R is unknown to the adversary in advance, and so the choice of which processes are faulty is made without knowledge of R. The size of W active , κ, is set so that only an exponentially small fraction of the messages can have a witness set that contains only faulty processes (who may be collaborating with the sender). If only t ≤ (n − 1)/3 members are faulty, then by the uniform distribution of R, the expected fraction of messages with a 'faulty' witness set is t n κ ≤ 1 3 κ . Relatively small values of κ are sufficient for this to be negligible. (As with the size of cryptographic keys, κ is effectively a constant.) This idea of forming distributed trust in a cooperation-resilient way borrows from the time-stamping mechanism of Haber et al. [8] . Moreover, we stipulate that correct processes multicast messages in sequence order, and enforce this ordering on message delivery. This prevents a malicious sender from scanning off-line the domain of <sender, seq> pairs for ones that have faulty witness sets and sending only those messages.
If R is invertible (an input pair can be easily computed from a desired output, i.e., a specific, presumably faulty, witness set) then after R is set, the adversary can compute which are the few messages it will be able to corrupt. The security of the active t protocol can be enhanced by the use of a public random oracle R, that maps <sender(m), seq(m)> onto 2 P , such that the output cannot be distinguished from a Fig. 4 . The activet protocol -no-failure regime random stream. It is assumed that the oracle can be accessed by all processes and responds to all queries with one (randomly chosen) mapping. By its randomness it is implied that the adversary cannot find inputs that map to faulty process sets. In practice, one adopts the random oracle methodology [1, 5] to approximate R, e.g., use a hash function (such as MD5 [20] ) in place of R, seeded with some input which is determined at set up time, e.g., by letting the processes collectively choose a random seed. Note again that by our assumptions, this implies that the adversary selects which processes are faulty without knowledge of R. Although this is widely done, we caution the reader that approximating R by a hash function has no proven security guarantees, and is only heuristically practically secure [4] .
The motivation for this protocol is to choose witness sets significantly smaller than 2t + 1. As a result, assuring both safety and availability is a problem: Since t of the witnesses could be faulty, for availability one might want to wait for only κ − t replies, but usually κ − t < 0. Therefore, to guarantee availability of a witness set for every message, active t incorporates the 3T protocol as a recovery-regime. This is done as follows: For a process to send a message, it attempts to obtain signed acknowledgments from W active (m). We name this the no-failure regime. After a timeout period, if p i has not obtained acknowledgments from all the members of W active (m), p i reverts to the 3T protocol and re-sends m to W 3T (m) to obtain signed acknowledgments from a subset of 2t + 1 processes. This is called the recovery regime.
The integration of the two protocols can potentially create an opportunity for a faulty process p i to obtain signed acknowledgments for conflicting messages. Specifically, process p i could first obtain acknowledgements from the small number of witnesses in W active (m), then select a different set of 2t + 1 processes to act as witnesses in the recovery regime. To decrease such a possibility of delivering conflicting messages in combining the two regimes, we provide two measures: First, we turn the witnesses of the no-failure regime into active participants. The (correct) members of W active (m) each probe W 3T (m) at δ randomly chosen peer processes before acknowledging a message. Since the peers are chosen by correct processes during protocol execution, (a correct) one is likely to be among any 2t + 1 processes chosen to act as witnesses in the recovery regime. Figure 4 depicts the active regime of the active t protocol.
1. For a process p i to perform WAN-multicast(m), (such that sender(m) = p i ), and p i has previously sent messages up to sequence number seq(m) − 1, p i sends <3T, regular, p i , seq(m), H(m)> to every process in W 3T (m), and waits to obtain A = {<3T, ack, p i , seq(m), H(m)> K j | p j ∈ P }, a set of signed acknowledgments from any subset P of W 3T (m) comprising of 2t + 1 distinct processes. Process p i then sends to every process in P <3T, deliver, m, A> .
2. When p i receives a message <3T, regular, p j , cnt, h> from p j , such that no conflicting message was previously received, p i sends to p j a signed acknowledgment <3T, ack, p j , cnt, h> K i .
3. When p i receives a message <3T, deliver, m, A>, such that A contains valid signatures for m from 2t + 1 members in W 3T (m), and such that delivery i [sender(m)] = seq(m) − 1, p i performs WAN-deliver(m) and sets delivery i [sender(m)] to seq(m). If a timeout period has passed and p j is not known to have delivered m, p i sends <3T, deliver, m, A> to p j . Fig. 3 . The 3T protocol Secondly, we stipulate that any correct process that receives (signed) conflicting messages immediately alerts the entire system. To guarantee that alerting the system will prevent conflicting messages from being delivered, in the recovery regime we force a delay before sending an acknowledgement. By our assumption model, such delay guarantees, with high probability, that any pending alert message will arrive at all correct processes. In practice, this delay can be reasonably small, e.g., by securing certain bandwidth for control messages and allowing out-of-band delivery of urgent communication.
In order to allow witnesses to probe their peers on behalf of sender(m), we require every process to sign its own "acknowledgement-seeking" (regular) messages. The peer processes record the message and do not reply if it conflicts with a previous message. Hence, knowledge of the message m propagates randomly among correct processes, without incurring additional signature overhead. In this way, if a message m conflicting with m has been sent to a set S ⊂ W 3T (m ) (= W 3T (m)) then with high probability the peers chosen on behalf of m intersect S at a correct process. More precisely, the probability that δ random probes cross a correct member of a recovery set containing 2t + 1 processes is at least 1 − 2t 3t+1 δ ≥ 1 − 2 3 δ . Therefore, the parameter δ can be chosen to achieve any desired level of probabilistic guarantee.
The details of the protocol are given in Fig. 5 . Throughout the protocol, if p i receives conflicting messages m and m properly signed by sender p j , p i immediately sends all processes alerting message containing m and m , using the fastest communication channels available to it. The alert message identifies without doubt a failure in p j due to the signatures on m, m . Once p j is known to have failed, all correct processes avoid message exchange with p j . Typically, a malicious sender may be deterred from sending conflicting messages as their presence would unquestionably implicate it.
Analysis
The active t protocol aims to maximize performance in faultless cases by minimizing the number of signed messages and the number of overall message exchanges. Stress is placed on minimizing digital signatures (to effectively a constant number per message), since the cost of producing digital signatures in software is at least one order of magnitude higher than message-sending, for typical message sizes.
The overhead in forming agreement on message contents in runs without failures or pre-mature timeouts is κ signature generations and κ message exchanges for collecting W active acknowledgments and δ × κ authenticated message exchanges with peers. We note that all of the overhead messages are small (containing fixed size hashes, signatures, and the like), signatures may be computed concurrently at all of the witnesses, and likewise, all pairs of message exchanges with peers may be done concurrently.
The overhead in case of failures can reach, in the worst case scenario, κ + 3t + 1 signatures and message exchanges with witnesses of both the no-failure regime and the recovery regime, and additionally, δ×κ authenticated message exchanges between witnesses and their peers. In addition, the recovery regime incurs a delay on acknowledgement sending to allow for possibly pending alert messages to reach their destination.
The level of guarantee achieved by active t depends on the parameters κ and δ. If the system contains as many as (n − 1)/3 faulty processes that know about each other (the worst case scenario), then one out of 3 κ messages, on average, will have a completely faulty W active set.
Since W active (m) is a function of sender(m) and seq(m), whenever W active (m) has a completely faulty witness set, sender(m) has the opportunity to collude with the faulty witnesses, and convince correct processes to WAN-deliver conflicting messages. Moreover, since the W active function is known to all participants, once the faulty processes and the W active function are determined, the adversary can predict the sequence number and sender of messages for which it can so collude and cause conflicting WAN-deliver events. Nonetheless, this is the case for only an exponentially-small fraction of the messages that are sent. By proper choice of the parameter κ, and given that messages are multicast in sequence order, then the likelihood of such a message occurring in the lifetime of the system can be made appropriately small.
There is also a chance of obtaining acknowledgments signed by correct members for conflicting messages by having non-intersecting sets of correct processes partici-1. For a process p i to WAN-multicast(m), (such that sender(m) = p i ), and p i has previously sent messages up to sequence number seq(m) − Note that p i does not send back to p j any information about peers i . 3. When p i receives a message <AV, inform, p j , cnt, h, sign> from p k , where sign is a valid signature of p j on <p j , cnt, h>, such that no conflicting message was previously received, it sends to p k <AV, verify, p j , cnt, h> .
4. When p i receives a message <3T, regular, p j , cnt, h> from p j , such that no conflicting message was previously received, it delays for a pre-determined timeout period and then sends to p j a signed acknowledgment <3T, ack, p j , cnt, h> K i .
5.
When p i receives <AV, deliver, m, A>, such that A contains a valid set of AV-acknowledgments from every member in W active (m), or a valid set of 2t + 1 3T-acknowledgments from W 3T (m), and such that delivery i [sender(m)] = seq(m) − 1, p i performs WAN-deliver(m) and sets delivery i [sender(m)] to seq(m). If a timeout period has passed and p j is not known to have delivered a message whose sequence number is seq(m) from sender(m), p i sends <AV, deliver, m, A> to p j . Fig. 5 . The activet protocol pate in the two protocol regimes, as follows: A faulty process p i could generate conflicting messages m, m , sent to W active (m) and S respectively, where S ⊂ W 3T (m ), |S| = 2t+1 and S ∩W active (m) = ∅. However, if W active (m) contains at least one correct member p h , then the probability that peers h does not intersect S at a correct member is at most 2 3 δ , which can be made as small as desired by choosing δ appropriately. For example, in a network of 100 processes, and assuming the number of faulty processes t ≤ 10, choosing κ = 3, δ = 5 will guarantee that conflicting messages are detected with probability at least 0.95, whereas in a network of 1000 processes with t ≤ 100, we can achieve 0.998 guarantee level with κ = 4, δ = 10.
Proof of correctness
We now proceed to prove Integrity, Self-delivery, Reliability and Probabilistic Agreement of the active t protocol. We note that due to the possibility of a completely faulty W active set, we cannot always leverage the correctness of the active t protocol from that of the E protocol, as we did in the 3T protocol.
We begin with a statement of several useful properties of the protocol from which its security leverages. We note that in any run of the active t protocol, no correct process multicasts conflicting messages and no correct process signs conflicting acknowledgements (3T or AV). In addition, we have the following properties: Proof. A correct process q signs a 3T acknowledgement for m only when it receives m over an authenticated channel from sender(m). Likewise, a correct process signs an AV acknowledgement only when the AV message contains a valid signature of sender(m). The first property then follows from the fact that a signed acknowledgement of the form <3T, ack, p, cnt, H(m)> Kq contains the identity of the sender p = sender(m), and a signed acknowledgement <AV, ack, p, cnt, H(m), sign> Kq contains both the sender's identity and its signature. For the second property, note that if the run contains a valid set of 3T acknowledgements for m, at least one of which must be from a correct process, then by item (1) of the lemma m was multicast by p. Likewise, if a valid set of AV acknowledgements are formed for m, then again by item (1) of the lemma m was multicast by p. Proof. That p i suppresses duplicate deliveries is immediate from the protocol. It is left to show that if sender(m) is correct, it must have sent m. For p i to deliver m, p i must have obtained a valid set of either AV acknowledgments or of 3T acknowledgements for m. By Lemma 5.1 (2) , m was WAN-multicast(m) by a correct sender(m). Proof. The theorem easily follows from the Self-delivery property of the 3T protocol, which is employed within some timeout from WAN-multicast(m) unless a valid set of AV acknowledgements for m is received first, enabling its delivery by p i . Proof. For p i to deliver m, p i must have obtained a valid set A of either AV acknowledgments or of 3T acknowledgements for m. If p i learns that p j delivered m satisfying seq(m ) = seq and sender(m ) = p k , then by SM Integrity we are done. Alternatively, if p i does not learn that p j delivered such m , then after a timeout period p i sends <AV, deliver, m, A> to p j . If p j has not delivered any conflicting message, then upon receipt of <AV, deliver, m, A> from p i , process p j performs WANdeliver(m). Otherwise, p j delivers some message m satisfying seq(m ) = seq and sender(m ) = p k . In either case, we are done. (We note that, if sender(m) is correct, then by Integrity m = m .)
Note that unlike the E and 3T protocols, in the active t protocol two correct processes are only guaranteed to deliver the same sequenced message, and not necessarily the same message. This follows because the protocol only satisfies the Probabilistic Agreement property, which allows, with some small probability, the delivery of conflicting messages by different processes.
We now prove that active t maintains Probabilistic Agreement:
Theorem 5.4 (Probabilistic Agreement) Let p i and p j be two correct processes participating in the active t protocol. Let p i deliver a message m, p j deliver m , such that sender(m) = sender(m ) and seq(m) = seq(m ). Then the probability that p i and p j delivered conflicting messages, i.e., m / = m , is at most 2t 3t+1 δ ≤ 2 3 δ 1 .
Proof. As argued in Theorem 3.5 above, for p i and p j to deliver m and m , respectively, they must have each delivered corresponding sets of valid acknowledgments A and A . Denote by witness(m) the set of processes represented in A, and likewise witness(m ). If witness(m) and witness(m ) intersect in an correct process, then we argue that m = m as in Theorem 3.5. It remains to compute the probability that conflicting message delivery is enabled in the case that witness(m) does not intersect witness(m ) at any correct member. To distinguish from case 1, assume that witness(m) contains at least one correct member p h . Note that the correct member p h chooses peers randomly, and does not disclose the composition of peers h to sender(m ). Moreover, by assumption there is a positive probability for each message from sender(m ) to W 3T (m ) to reach its destination (independent of the choice of peers h ). Thus, the choice of peers h is independent from the choice of any process in witness(m ). Therefore, the probability that p h does not reach any correct member in witness(m ) in δ probes is at most 2t
Thus, the overall probability for conflicting message to be deliverable is bounded by 1
Obviously, the probability above can be made as small as desired by appropriate choice of κ, δ, for appropriate system sizes (i.e., such that n − t ≥ κδ).
Optimizations
It is possible to improve the fault tolerance of the active t protocol family by allowing any subset of κ − C witnesses out of the designated W active set, where C is some constant, to validate a message. Unfortunately, while this improves resilience to benign failures, it increases the probability of a faulty witness set. Nevertheless, suppose that t = (n − 1)/3 . The probability P κ,C of a faulty set of κ − C out of κ randomly chosen processes is bounded by:
This probability tends to zero if we choose C κ. Therefore, this allows us to increase the fault tolerance while preserving safety to any desirable degree.
Similar improvement can be made by accommodating failures in the peer sets designated by processes in the active probing phase. The details of the error probabilities induced by such optimizations can be easily worked out, similarly to the error probability above.
Load
Our protocols were designed to bring down the cost of forming agreement on message delivery. This was done by reducing the size of witness sets used in our protocols. A related measure of protocol efficiency is the load it incurs over participating processes, where by load we mean the expected maximum number of times any server is accessed per message. To compute load, we need to grow a set M of randomly selected messages to infinity, and examine the number of accesses at the busiest server divided by |M |. (This definition is motivated by Naor and Wool [15] , adapting their definition of load to our case where distinct messages have different witness ranges.) We remark that this definition does not distinguish between the accesses requiring a server to sign messages and ones requiring it only to respond.
We first look at the expected access probability of the busiest server in runs without failures or premature timeouts. For the 3T protocol, the witness sets of messages are subsets of 2t + 1 processes (each chosen out of a designated range W 3T of 3t + 1). If the W 3T (m) function randomizes the choice of processes and likewise, within every witness range 2t + 1 processes are selected randomly, then as the number of (randomly selected) messages grows, the failure-free load on the busiest server tends to (2t + 1)/n.
In the active t protocol with parameters κ and δ, a message m's delivery involves accessing (in runs without failures or pre-mature timeouts) a set W active (m) of κ witnesses and a choice of κ × δ peer processes. The choice of W active (m) and peers is randomized, giving uniform probabilities for each process to be accessed when taken at the limit, as the set of messages goes to infinity. Therefore, the failure-free load of the active t protocol is κ(δ + 1)/n.
If failures occur in the 3T protocol, then the load incurred is bounded by (3t + 1)/n. This might be acceptable if t n. In the active t protocol, failures may prevent access to W active (m) or to some peers and require accessing some subset of W 3T (m) processes for recovery. The load of active t in case of failures is bounded by (κ(δ+1)+(3t+1))/n.
Conclusions
Experience in constructing robust distributed systems [7, 11, 16, 18, 19] shows that (secure) reliable multicast is an important tool for distributed applications. Implementing reliable multicast in an insecure environment with arbitrary failures incurs inevitable overhead required for maintaining consistency. However, a price that may be acceptable in a small network becomes intolerable for a very large system.
In this paper, we have shown two approaches in which the requirements on the system may be weakened in order to allow for more efficient implementations of reliable multicast: The first is suitable for environments in which failures are rare, and where therefore, it is reasonable to assume a low threshold on the number of failures. The second relaxes the consistency requirement to allow an exponentially small fraction of the messages to be delivered inconsistently. This approach is practical when reversing the effects of (a small number of) bad message deliveries is possible. In both cases, we have devised protocols that meet the requirements and incur costs that do not grow with the system size, in normal faultless scenarios.
